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Abstract
The Church-Turing Thesis confuses numerical computations with sym-
bolic computations. In particular, any model of computability in which
equality is not definable, such as the λ-models underpinning higher-order
programming languages, is not equivalent to the Turing model. However,
a modern combinatory calculus, the SF -calculus, can define equality of
its closed normal forms, and so yields a model of computability that is
equivalent to the Turing model. This has profound implications for pro-
gramming language design.
1 Introduction
The λ-calculus [17, 4] does not define the limit of expressive power for higher-
order programming languages, even when they are implemented as Turing ma-
chines [69]. That this seems to be incompatible with the Church-Turing Thesis
is due to confusion over what the thesis is, and confusion within the thesis itself.
According to Soare [63, page 11], the Church-Turing Thesis is first mentioned
in Steven Kleene’s book Introduction to Metamathematics [42]. However, the
thesis is never actually stated there, so that each later writer has had to find
their own definition. The main confusions within the thesis can be exposed by
using the book to supply the premises for the argument in Figure 1 overleaf.
The conclusion asserts the λ-definability of equality of closed λ-terms in normal
form, i.e. syntactic equality of their deBruijn representations [20]. Since the
conclusion is false [4, page 519] there must be a fault in the argument.
The basic error is introduced by statement (2), since Turing’s proof was
for numerical functions, i.e. functions acting on natural numbers or positive
integers, and not for symbolic functions, i.e. functions acting on words in some
alphabet, usually well-formed formulas, such as λ-terms. So, there is a confusion
between numerical interpretation and symbolic interpretation. Since the link to
higher-order programming concerns symbolic functions, we should replace (2)
by a less ambiguous statement, such as:
(2′) The computable symbolic functions are equivalent to the λ-definable sym-
bolic functions.
Now the focus shifts to the nature of the equivalence in (2′) and its use when
inferring (3). We will see that the traditional arguments do indeed induce a
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(1) “... every function which would naturally be regard-
ed as computable is computable under his [Turing’s]
definition, i.e. by one of his machines ...” (page 376)
(2) “The equivalence of the computable to the λ-
definable functions . . . was proved by Turing 1937.” (page 320)
(3) Every function which would naturally be regarded
as computable is λ-definable. (equivalence)
(4) The equality of λ-terms in closed normal form is
λ-definable. (specialise)
Figure 1: A faulty argument, with premises quoted from Kleene [42]
relationship between a λ-model of computability and a Turing model, in that
each can simulate the other, but this mutual simulation is too weak to be an
equivalence, to support the substitution of “λ-definable” for “computable” in
the argument.
Thus we have three confusions. The faulty argument exposes the confusion of
numerical functions with symbolic ones, and of mutual simulation with equiv-
alence. Then there is the confusion about what, exactly, the Church-Turing
Thesis is.
We will explore these confusions in three stages. First, we will explore the
confusion surrounding Church’s Thesis, as introduced by Kleene [42]. This will
lead us to formalise models of computability and their relative expressive power.
It will follow that any λ-model of computability that is suitable for modeling
higher-order programming languages is less expressive than the recursive model.
Second, we will extend the analysis to Turing’s Thesis and the Church-Turing
Thesis, and their impact on programming language design. Third, we will show
that a recent combinatory calculus, the SF -calculus [34] yields a model of com-
putability that is both suitable for higher-order programming and equivalent to
the Turing model. By supporting a form of intensional computation, it suggests
a more powerful approach to programming language design.
The sections of the paper are: Section 1 Introduction; Section 2 Church’s
Thesis; Section 3 Models of computability; Section 4 Comparison of models;
Section 5 Turing’s Thesis; Section 6 The Church-Turing Thesis; Section 7 Pro-
gramming language design; Section 8 Intensional computation; and Section 9
Conclusions.
2 Church’s Thesis
The background to Church’s Thesis is Church’s paper of 1936 An unsolvable
problem of number theory [16] which, alongside Alan Turing’s work discussed
later, showed that some numerical problems do not have a computable solution,
so that Hilbert’s decision problem does not have a general solution. It is clear
that Church’s focus was on numerical functions, as all his formal definitions
were expressed in numerical terms. For example, he writes, “A function F of
one positive integer is said to be λ-definable if . . . ” [16, page 349]. Again,
in Theorem XVII he writes “Every λ-definable function of positive integers is
recursive”.
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That said, he does broaden the discussion when considering effective calcu-
lability. On the one hand, an effectively calculable function of positive integers
is defined to be “a recursive functions of positive integers” or “a λ-definable
function of positive integers”. On the other hand, he writes:
. . . [in] some particular system of symbolic logic . . . it is necessary
that each rule of procedure be an effectively calculable operation,
. . . Suppose we interpret this to mean that, in terms of a system of
Go¨del representations for the expressions of the logic, each rule of
procedure must be a recursive operation, . . .
That is to say, a symbolic function is recursive if it can be simulated by a
numerical function that is recursive, where simulation is defined using Go¨del
numbering. Further, the difference between the numerical and symbolic domains
does not seem to be important to him, as he writes, in a footnote:
. . . in view of the Go¨del representation and the ideas associated with
it, symbolic logic can now be regarded, mathematically, as a branch
of elementary number theory.
In contrast to Church’s narrow constructions, Kleene’s definitions have a
broad scope. For example, he gives three definitions of λ-definability in his pa-
per λ-definability and recursiveness [41], according to whether the domain of
definition is the non-negative integers, the λ-terms themselves, or other mathe-
matical entities for which a λ-representation has been given. It is the interplay
between these definitions that is the primary cause of confusion.
Kleene introduces Church’s Thesis as Thesis I in his 1952 book (Section 60,
page 300) as follows:
(CT) Every effectively calculable function (effectively decidable predicate) is
general recursive.
The crucial question is to determine the domain of the effectively calculable
functions.
At the point where Church’s Thesis is stated, in Section 60, the general
recursive functions are all numerical, so it would seem that the effectively calcu-
lable functions must also be numerical. However, he does not include the phrase
“of positive integers” in his statement of the thesis, in the careful manner of
Church. We are required to add this rider in order to make sense of the thesis.
Later, in Section 62. Church’s Thesis, Kleene presents seven pages of ar-
guments for the thesis, which he groups under four headings A–D. In “(B)
Equivalence of diverse formulations” he asserts that the set of λ-definable func-
tions and the set of Turing computable functions are “co-extensive” with the
set of general recursive functions. Again, this only makes sense if the functions
are presumed to be numerical functions. This paragraph is also the source of
statement (2) from Figure 1.
If we were to stop at this point, then the explanation of the faulty argument
would be quite simple: statement (2) should be read in a context where all
functions are numerical, or be replaced by “The equivalence of the computable
to the λ-definable numerical functions was proved by Turing 1937”. The re-
striction to numerical functions propagates to statement (3) which cannot then
be specialised to equality of λ-terms.
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However, in “(D) Symbolic logics and symbolic algorithms”, Kleene reprises
Church’s definition of symbolic functions that are recursive, so that, by the end
of Section 62, we have two definitions of effectively calculable functions and of
recursive functions. So there are two versions of Church’s Thesis, one for nu-
merical functions (NCT) and one for symbolic functions (SCT). Unpacking the
definition of a general recursive symbolic function to make the role of simulations
explicit, the two versions become:
(NCT) Every effectively calculable numerical function (effectively decidable
numerical predicate) is general recursive.
(SCT) Every effectively calculable function (effectively decidable predicate)
can be simulated by a function which is general recursive.
Summarising, we see that Church was careful to separate theorems about
numerical functions from the discussion of computation in symbolic logic. By
contrast, Kleene presents a single statement of Church’s Thesis with evidence
that confuses the numerical with the symbolic. In turn, this confuses two dif-
ferent questions: whether two sets of numerical functions are the same; and
whether there is an encoding that allows functions in a symbolic logic to be
simulated by recursive functions on numbers. These confusions can be defused
by isolating two versions of Church’s Thesis which, from the viewpoint of Post
[57], qualify as scientific laws. Now this distinction is enough to eliminate the
numerical version of the faulty argument but the symbolic version remains.
To eliminate it, we must show that an equivalence of models of computation
requires more than their mutual simulation. To make this precise, we must
formally define models of computability, their simulations and equivalence.
3 Models of computability
We adopt the simplest definition of model of computability in which the discus-
sion of simulation makes sense. This was introduced by Boker and Dershowitz
as a model of computation [9], but since the focus is upon functions for which
a computation is possible, rather than the actual mechanics of computation, it
seems more accurate to call them models of computability. Note, too, that the
domain of the computable functions is not actually required to be symbolic in
any way, or even to be enumerable, however natural this may be. This makes
the notion too weak for many purposes, but here it emphasises the generality
of our results.
A model of computability (D,F) is given by a domain D which is a set of
values that provides arguments and results of computations, and a collection F
of partial functions from powers of D to D. Here are some examples.
The partial recursive functions on natural numbers form a model with do-
main given by the natural numbers and functions given by the partial recursive
functions. Call this the recursive model of computability.
Recall that an injective function is a total function that does not identify
distinct arguments. For any finite alphabet Σ, and any domainD equipped with
an injective function fromD to the words of Σ, the Turing model of computability
on D has domain D and partial functions given by those which can be computed
by a Turing machine with alphabet Σ. When the choice of domain is understood
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from the context, or unimportant, then it may be called the Turing model of
computability.
Any applicative rewriting system [67] has a normal model whose values are
the closed terms in normal form, and whose partial functions are those rep-
resentable by closed terms in normal form. Further, any subset D of values
determines a model, where the partial functions are now defined on a value in
D only if the result is also in D.
For example, classical combinatory logic has terms built from applications
of the operators S and K and variables. As well as its normal model, there is a
numerical model whose domain is restricted to be the Church numerals. Also,
one can use Polish notation to encode combinators as words using the alphabet
Σ = {A,S,K}, where A is for application. For example, S(KK) is mapped to
ASAKK. This yields a Turing model of computability for SK-normal forms.
Similarly, λ-calculus has normal models and numerical models, once the
terms and reduction rules have been specified. First, a λ-term is unchanged
by renaming of bound variables, i.e. is an α-equivalence class in the syntax [4].
Since this equivalence is a distraction, we will work with λ-terms using deBruijn
notation [20] so that, for example, λx.x becomes λ0 and λx.λy.xy becomes λλ10.
Second, there are various choices of reduction rules possible, with each choice
producing a normal λ-model. Define a λ-model of higher-order programming to
be any normal λ-model in which equality of closed normal forms is not defin-
able. This excludes any model whose domain is numerical, and would seem to
include any models that are relevant to higher-order programming. Certainly
the λ-models of higher-order programming include those given by β-reduction
alone, or βη-reduction.
4 Comparison of models
Now consider what it means for one model of computability to be more expres-
sive than another. The simple interpretation requires that their computable
functions have the same domain and then compares sets of computable functions
by subset inclusion, as is done by John Mitchell [49] and Neil Jones [39]. The
choice of domain is important here. For example, if the domain consists of nat-
ural numbers then the λ-model and the recursive model are indeed equivalent.
However, this restriction is unreasonable for modeling higher-order program-
ming since functions must be among the values. Now it is an easy matter to
see that any normal λ-model of computability has fewer computable functions
than the Turing model. For example, no λ-term can decide equality of values
but this function is in the Turing model.
The complex interpretation of relative expressive power allows the domains
to vary, but now the comparison of computability over domains D1 and D2 must
be mediated by simulations, which are given by encodings. Note that it makes
no sense to consider a simulation in one direction, and compare sets of functions
in the other direction, since, as observed by Boker and Dershowitz [9], this can
lead to paradoxes. Rather, there should be encodings of each domain in the
other that are, in some sense, inverse to each other. Various choices are possible
here but two requirements seem to be essential. First, the encodings should be
injective functions, since distinct values should not be identified. Second, the
encodings should be passive, in the sense that they are not adding expressive
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power beyond that of their target model. In particular, they should be effectively
calculable. This requirement can only be verified informally, on a case by case
basis, since functions from D1 to D2 are not in the scope of either model.
A simulation of a model of computability (D1,F1) in another such (D2,F2)
is given by an injective encoding ρ : D1 → D2 such that every function f1
in F1 can be simulated by a function f2 in F2 in the following sense: for all
x1, . . . , xn ∈ D1 such that f1(x1, . . . , xn) is defined, then f2(ρ(x1), . . . , ρ(xn)) is
defined and
ρ(f1(x1, . . . , xn)) = f2(ρ(x1), . . . , ρ(xn)) .
For example, Go¨delisation provides a simulation of the normal SK-model
into the recursive model. More generally, Church and Kleene both use this
notion of simulation to define recursive symbolic functions. Go¨delisation seems
to be passive.
Further, the encoding of the natural numbers using Church numerals pro-
vides a simulation of the recursive model into the normal SK-model or any
normal λ-model.
Other related notions of simulation can be found in the literature, e.g. [39, 9].
For example, Richard Montague [52, page 430] considers, and Hartley Rogers
[59, page 28] adopts, a slightly different approach, in which the encoding of
numbers is achieved by reversing a bijective Go¨delisation. However, this inverse
encoding may not be a simulation. For example, the equality of numbers cannot
be simulated by a λ-term over the domain of closed λ-terms in normal form.
Rogers, like Kleene, ensures a simulation by defining the computable functions
in the symbolic domain to be all simulations of partial recursive functions, but
this says nothing about λ-definability.
Given the formal definition of simulations, it may appear that the strongest
possible notion of equivalence is that each model simulates the other. However,
if the encodings are passive then so are the recodings from D1 to D1 and from
D2 to D2 obtained by encoding twice. Since these are in the scope of the two
models, we can require that recodings be computable.
Let (D1,F1) and (D2,F2) be two models of computability with simulations
ρ2 : D1 → D2 and ρ1 : D2 → D1. Then (D2,F2) is at least as expressive
as (D1,F1) if the recoding ρ2 ◦ ρ1 : D2 → D2 is computable in F2. If, in
addition, (D1,F1) is more expressive than (D2,F2) then the two models are
weakly equivalent. Note that this notion of equivalence is indeed an equivalence
relation on models of computability.
It is interesting to compare this definition with those for equivalence of partial
combinatory algebras by Cockett and Hofstra [19] and John Longley [45]. They
would not require the encodings to be injective, but Longley would require
that the recodings be invertible. Adding the latter requirement is perfectly
reasonable but is immaterial in the current setting.
It is easy to prove that the recursive model is at least as expressive as any
λ-model. Our focus will be on the converse.
Theorem 1 Any model of computability that is at least as expressive as the
recursive function model can define equality of values.
Proof The recursive model is presumed to use 0 and 1 for booleans. In
the other model, identify the booleans with the encodings of 0 and 1 so that
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the equality function is given by recoding its arguments and then applying the
simulation of the equality of numbers. ✷
Corollary 2 The normal model of computability for SK-calculus is not weakly
equivalent to the recursive function model.
Proof If the normal SK-model could define equality then it could distinguish
the values SKK and SKS but the standard translation from combinatory logic
to λ-calculus identifies them (both reduce to the identity), and so they cannot
be distinguished by any SK-combinator. ✷
Corollary 3 No λ-model of higher-order programming is weakly equivalent to
the recursive model of computability.
Proof Since normal λ-models do not define equality, the result is immedi-
ate. Note that Longley has proved the analogous result for his definition of
equivalence [45]. ✷
5 Turing’s Thesis
Turing’s paper of 1936 On Computable Numbers, with an application to the
Entscheidungsproblem was, like Church’s paper, concerned with numerical com-
putation and Hilbert’s decision problem. Like Church, Turing was careful to
limit his definitions, e.g. of computable functions, to numerical functions while
showing awareness of a broader scope. For example, in the first paragraph he
writes:
Although the subject of this paper is ostensibly the computable num-
bers, it is almost equally easy to define and investigate computable
functions of an integral variable, or a real or computable variable,
computable predicates, and so forth.
Similarly, the use of an unspecified alphabet of symbols on the tape of a Tur-
ing machine encourages us to consider computation over arbitrary symbolic
domains.
Once again, Kleene confuses these two meanings in his third piece of evidence
for Church’s Thesis, headed (C): Turing’s concept of a computing machine [42,
page 320] where Kleene writes “Turing’s computable functions (1936-7) are those
which can be computed by a machine of a kind which is designed, according to
his analysis, to reproduce all the sorts of operations which a human computer
could perform, working according to preassigned instructions.” As we have
seen above “Turing’s computable functions” are, by definition, numerical, while
a human computer faces no such restriction.
In more compressed form, this confusion re-appears in Kleene’s statement
of Turing’s Thesis. It is given in Section 70. Turing’s thesis, as a sub-ordinate
clause of the opening statement which, when elevated to an independent thesis,
becomes:
(TT) Every function which would naturally be regarded as computable is com-
putable under Turing’s definition, i.e. by one of his machines.
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Now the phrase “every function which would naturally be regarded as com-
putable” surely includes all computations in formal systems such as λ-calculus
or combinatory logic. For example, it would be a distortion to assume that
“naturally” here refers to the natural numbers. On the other hand, “Turing’s
definition” is certainly numerical. As with Church’s Thesis, the solution is to
create a numerical thesis (NTT) and a symbolic one (STT) as follows:
(NTT) Every numerical function which would naturally be regarded as com-
putable is computable under Turing’s definition.
(STT) Every function which would naturally be regarded as computable can
be simulated by a function which is computable under Turing’s definition.
From the viewpoint of Post [57], both versions of the thesis will qualify as
scientific laws. Now we can express some classical results in the new terminology.
Theorem 4 Turing’s Numerical Thesis is logically equivalent to Church’s Nu-
merical Thesis.
Proof Apply Kleene’s 30th theorem, i.e. Theorem XXX [42, page 376]. ✷
Theorem 5 The recursive model of computability is weakly equivalent to any
Turing model of computability.
Proof The traditional simulations yield encodings that are computable. ✷
Corollary 6 Turing’s Symbolic Thesis is logically equivalent to Church’s Sym-
bolic Thesis.
Proof Any simulation into a Turing model yields a simulation into the recur-
sive model by composing with the simulation given by weak equivalence. The
converse is similar. ✷
Corollary 7 No λ-model of higher-order programming is weakly equivalent to
the Turing model.
Proof Since weak equivalence is transitive, the result follows from Corollar-
ies 3 and 5. ✷
Now any reasonable notion of equivalence must imply weak equivalence. So
it follows that the Turing model of computability is strictly more expressive than
any λ-model of computability suitable for modeling higher-order programming.
6 The Church-Turing Thesis
The mathematical confusions are now defused, with separate numerical and
symbolic versions of Church’s Thesis and of Turing’s Thesis, and a clear account
of equivalence of models. In turn, this must require two versions of the Church-
Turing Thesis. Putting this defusion to one side, there remains some confusion
about what, exactly, the Church-Turing Thesis is since, although introduced in
Kleene’s book [42, page 382], it is nowhere defined. We have evidence for four
accounts.
Among the statements in Kleene’s book, the closest candidate is the opening
of Section 70:
8
D
R
A
FT
Turing’s thesis that every function which would naturally be re-
garded as computable is computable under his definition, i.e. by
one of his machines, is equivalent to Church’s thesis by Theorem
XXX.
On first reading, it is rather difficult to determine the nature of this declaration,
as it contains the statement of Turing’s thesis (TT) plus the statement of a
theorem,
Turing’s Thesis is equivalent to Church’s Thesis.
with its proof “by Theorem XXX”. If this is the Church-Turing Thesis, then it
is a theorem asserting logical equivalence of two theses. The other candidate
statement is the numerical version of (2) from Figure 1 which is also a theorem,
but this time asserting mathematical equivalence of two models.
According to Solomon Feferman [22], the Church-Turing Thesis was born
in Alonzo Church’s 1937 review of Alan Turing’s paper on computability [69]
which declared
As a matter of fact, there is involved here the equivalence of three
different notions: computability by a Turing machine, general recur-
siveness in the sense of Herbrand-Go¨del-Kleene, and λ- definability
in the sense of Kleene and the present reviewer.
If by “notion” is meant a model of computability, then Church’s statement is
about equivalence of models. Feferman goes on to say
Thus was born what is now called the Church-Turing Thesis, accord-
ing to which the effectively computable functions are exactly those
computable by a Turing machine. The (Church-)Turing Thesis . . .
Now Feferman identifies the Church-Turing Thesis with the (Church)-Turing
Thesis with Kleene’s account of Turing’s Thesis. It seems that Feferman con-
siders this to be a single thesis with two (or three) names.
Finally, the literature of the last fifty years has thrown up many versions
of the theses, e.g. [25, 62, 5]. The best way to make sense of this variety is to
view the Church-Turing Thesis as the class of all statements that are logically
equivalent to Church’s Thesis or to Turing’s Thesis. In this manner, all of the
theses and proofs of logical equivalence are gathered under a single heading.
This broad interpretation may explain why Kleene did not give a statement
of it. In any event, this broad interpretation seems most appropriate when
considering the impact of the Church-Turing Thesis on programming language
design.
7 Programming language design
Here are four examples, from the last fifty years, of how confusion in the Church-
Turing Thesis has limited the design space for programming languages.
Peter Landin’s seminal paper of 1966 The Next 700 Programming Languages
[44] proposes a powerful model of programming language development in which
λ-calculus is the universal intermediate language. That is: create a source lan-
guage with various additional features such as types, or let-declarations; trans-
form this into λ-calculus; then implement an evaluation strategy for λ-calculus
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(e.g. lazy or eager) as a Turing machine. His main comment about the suitability
of λ-calculus for this role is:
A possible first step in the research program is 1700 doctoral theses
called ”A Correspondence between x and Church’s λ-notation.”
which is footnoted “A not inappropriate title [for this paper] would have been
“Church without lambda.”” So, Landin sees a central role for λ-calculus, with
a research program that would occupy a generation of computer scientists. The
simplest interpretation of “Church without lambda” is “Church’s Thesis without
lambda”. This research program influenced many languages designs, including
Algol68 [58], Scheme [65], and ML [48].
Matthias Felleisen, in his paper of 1990 on the expressive power of program-
ming languages [23], comments:
Comparing the set of computable functions that a language can rep-
resent is useless because the languages in question are usually uni-
versal; other measures do not exist.
After this appeal to the Church-Turing Thesis, the paper goes on to consider
various λ-calculi, in the belief that nothing has been left out. Although Felleisen
makes some useful distinctions, his paper excludes the possibility of going be-
yond λ-calculus, which limits its scope.
Henk Barendregt et al [6] present a current version of the Church-Turing
Thesis:
Church-Turing Thesis The notion of intuitive computability is
exactly captured by λ-definability or by Turing computability.
It overstates the significance of λ-calculus, since “exactly captured” suggests an
equivalence of models, that goes beyond the existence of mutual simulations. It
is a paraphrase of statement (2) from the faulty argument.
Robert Harper’s book Practical Foundations for Programming Languages
[30] contains a version of Church’s Thesis (given as Church’s Law) which is
careful to limit its scope to natural numbers. It also emphasises that equality is
not λ-definable (given as Scott’s Theorem). However, while the title proclaims
the subject matter to be the foundation for programming languages in general, it
is solely focused on the λ-calculus, with no allowance made for other possibilities.
If there remains any doubt about the author’s views about foundations, consider
the following slogan, attributed to him by Dana Scott in the year of the book’s
publication. In a talk during the Turing Centenary celebrations of 2012, he
asserts [61]:
λ conquers all!
There is no explicit justification given for this focus, which we can only assume
is based upon Landin’s research program, and the Church-Turing Thesis.
Here are some examples of calculi and languages that don’t easily fit into
Landin’s program, since they may exceed the expressive power of λ-calculus.
Candidates include: first-order languages such as SQL [15]; languages without
an underlying calculus, such as Lisp [47] with its operators car and cdr; and
the intensional programming language Rum [66]. Richer examples include the
self-calculus of Abadi and Cardelli for object-orientation [1], the pattern calculus
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for structure polymorphism [38], the pure pattern calculus for generic queries of
data structures [35, 33]. Again, the bondi programming language [10] uses pure
pattern calculus to support both generic forms of the usual database queries,
and a pattern-matching account of object-orientation, including method special-
isation, sub-typing, etc. Most recently, SF -calculus is a combinatory calculus
that extends generic queries from data structures to functions of all kinds [34].
The approach supports definable equality of closed normal forms, typed self-
interpreters [36] (see also [56]), and Guy Steele’s approach [64] to growing a
language [37]. It can also be extended to a concurrent setting [27, 26]. The
richer calculi above have not been shown equivalent to λ-calculus. Rather, all
evidence points the other way, since the factorisation operator F of SF -calculus
cannot be defined in SK-calculus [34].
Summarising, while the ability to simulate λ-calculus as a Turing machine
has been enormously fruitful, the larger claims of the Church-Turing Thesis
have been suggesting unnecessary limits on programming language design for
almost fifty years.
8 Intensional computation
Having exposed a gap between the expressive power of λ-calculus and of Turing
machines, it is natural to consider how to bridge it.
It is not a simple matter to overcome the limitations of λ-calculus by, say,
adding an operator for equality. The essential difficulty is that while λ-terms
describe algorithms, i.e. capture intensions, this intensional information cannot
be recovered from within λ-calculus in any uniform manner. Rather λ-terms can
only extract extensional information about input-output behaviour [17, page
2]. To redress this, various efforts have been made, in the context of partial
evaluation and decompilation, to extend λ-calculus with Go¨delisation. This
has been done for simply typed λ-calculus [7], a combinatory calculus [29], and
untyped λ-calculus augmented with some labels [51]. However, some of the
attractive features of pure λ-calculus, such as being typable, confluent, and a
rewriting system have been compromised.
Alternatively, the development of intensional computation can begin afresh.
Intensionality has been the subject of much research by philosophers [52, 21,
14, 40], logicians [24, 68, 12], type theorists [46, 53, 11] and computer scientists
[31, 3, 13], so before proceeding, let us determine what it will mean for us. In
the concrete setting of λ-calculus, when should two λ-terms be considered inten-
sionally equal? Should this be limited to closed normal forms or are arbitrary
terms to be included? In part, the answer depends upon whether your semantics
is denotational or operational.
Denotational semantics constructs the meaning of a program from that of
its fragments, whose contexts may supply values to free variables, or determine
whether or not the evaluation of the fragment terminates. Examples may be
found in domain theory [43, 60], abstract and algebraic data types [28, 50], the ef-
fective topos [32], and partial combinatory algebras [8, 18, 45]. This suggests that
all terms are included but equality of arbitrary lambda terms is not computable
[4, page 519].
By contrast, other semantics do not account for terms without normal form
or for open terms, and so avoid the need to assign them values. For exam-
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ple, axiomatic recursion theory [59, 39] uses Kleene equality [42, page 327].
Again, operational semantics in the style of Gordon Plotkin’s structured oper-
ational semantics [55] can limit its values to be closed terms that are, in some
sense, normal, e.g. are irreducible, or in head-normal form [4], etc. Thereby,
various problems caused by non-termination, such as the difficulty of defining
the parallel-or function [2], do not arise. In particular, it is easy to represent
equality.
Thus, the challenge is to extend standard calculi with the ability to query
the internal structure of closed normal forms, in a process akin to Go¨delisation,
while retaining many of the attractive features of λ-calculus, such as being a
rewriting system, especially one that is confluent or typable.
The SF -calculus achieves this by replacing the operator K of SK-calculus
with a factorisation operator F that is able to test the internal structure of
terms that are, in some sense, head normal, by factoring them. The operator
F takes three arguments. If O is an operator and M and N are combinators
then FOMN reduces to M , so that FF represents the traditional K. If PQ
is a compound then F (PQ)MN reduces to NPQ, so that N can manipulate
the components separately. It cannot be stressed too much that not every ap-
plication is a compound. Rather, compounds are applications that can never
be reduced at their head. That is, they are given by all partially applied op-
erators such as SM and SMN and F and FMP for any terms M,N and P .
Non-examples include fully applied operators such as SMNP and FMNP , and
terms headed by a variable, such as xM . The latter is excluded since substi-
tution may create a fully applied operator. Using factorisation, closed normal
forms can be completely analysed into their constituent operators, whose equal-
ity can be tested by extensional means. Details of the calculus can be found in
the original paper [34].
Theorem 8 The normal model of computability for SF -calculus is equivalent
to the recursive model.
Proof That Go¨delisation and Church encoding are both simulations follows
from the work of Church [16] and Kleene [41], so that it is enough to show
that both re-codings are computable. It is easy to see that the recoding of
numbers to numbers is recursive. In the other direction, the recoding of SF -
combinators can be described by a pattern-matching function that acts on the
combinators in normal form. Such pattern-matching functions are represented
by SF -combinators because SF -calculus is structure complete [34]. Note that
this proof does not apply for SK-calculus as this is merely combinatorially
complete [67]. Also, since the recodings are invertible, this is an equivalence of
partial combinatory algebras, in the sense of Longley [45]. ✷
To the extent that λ-calculus is equivalent to SK-calculus, this makes SF -
calculus a superior foundation for higher-order programming languages.
9 Conclusions
The Church-Turing Thesis has been a confusion since it was first named, but
not defined, by Kleene in 1952. The numerical results of Church and Turing
support numerical versions of their eponymous theses, in which sets of numer-
ical functions are co-extensive. Further, there are separate theses for symbolic
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computation, involving simulations of one model of computability in another.
Kleene confused these two settings, with a little encouragement from Church.
Once the role of simulations is made explicit, it is easier to see that mutual
simulation yields an equivalence of models only if both re-codings are com-
putable, each in its respective model. This requirement exposes the limitations
of λ-calculus, since Go¨delisation is not λ-definable, even for closed λ-terms in
normal form.
These limitations are, in some sense, well known within the λ-calculus com-
munity, in that λ-calculus cannot define equality, even of closed normal forms.
Indeed, those working with categorical models of computability, or analysing
programs defined as λ-terms, are acutely aware of these limitations. However,
the community as a whole is not keen to advertise any of this, proclaiming in-
stead that λ conquers all. Students who ask the wrong questions may be told
“Beware the Turing tarpit!” [54] or “Don’t look under the lambda!” which
closes off discussion without clarifying anything.
The limitations of λ-calculus are essential to its nature, since λ-terms cannot
directly query the internal structure of their arguments; the expressive power of
λ-calculus is extensional. This does not matter for numerical computations since
the internal structure of a natural number is determined by the zero-test and
the predecessor function, both of which are recursive. However, this approach
cannot be generalised to query internal structure in richer settings.
Rather, intensional computation requires a fresh outlook. The simplest il-
lustration of this is the SF -calculus whose factorisation operator F is able to
uniformly decompose normal forms to their constituent operators. Since SF -
calculus also has all of the expressive power of SK-calculus, its normal model of
computability is equivalent to the Turing model or the recursive function model.
The implications of this for programming language design are profound. The
bondi programming language has already shown how the usual database queries
can be made polymorphic, and that object-orientation can be defined in terms
of pattern-matching. Now the factorisation operator paves the way for program
analysis to be conducted in the source language, so that growing a language can
become easier than ever.
In short, confusion in the Church-Turing Thesis has obscured the funda-
mental limitations of λ-calculus as a foundation for programming languages. It
is time to wind up Landin’s research program, and pursue the development of
intensional calculi and programming languages.
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